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ABSTRACT
A family office is a private firm that manages the wealth of a high net
worth family. This article explores Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-l, the
"Family Office Rule, " which excludes qualifying family offices from regu-
lation under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Section I discusses the
business role family offices play and general trends in family office govern-
ance. Section H provides an overview of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, in order to put the Family Office Rule in context. Section III compre-
hensively discusses the Family Office Rule, including its origins in the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 as well as the specific requirements of the rule
promulgated by the SEC in 2011. The rule's definition of "family client"
and its restrictions on the ownership and control of family offices are dis-
cussed in detail.
While this article fully supports the policy behind the Family Office
Rule-of allowing families to conduct their personal investment activities
privately and free of Advisers Act regulation-this article is critical of the
SEC's narrow interpretation of the rule's "control" requirement. The staff
of the SEC Division of Investment Management currently interprets the
rule to require a majority of a family office's board of directors to be fam-
ily members, even though the rule's text does not compel such an interpre-
tation. This article argues that the SEC should broaden its interpretation of
the control requirement to allow family offices to use the governance struc-
ture that best suits their particular needs, including a board of directors
consisting of a majority of non-family members.
INTRODUCTION
HIRTSLEEVES to shirtsleeves in three generations." The old
saying epitomizes the propensity of family-owned enterprises
to fail, and the broader difficulties families face in sustaining
wealth across generations.1 Like many aphorisms, of course, the phrase is
not universally true. There are numerous examples of successful family-
owned businesses and of wealth in families that has sustained for three
generations and beyond.2 Interestingly, however, the data on family-
owned businesses indicates that there is at least a kernel of truth in the
old saying. Approximately 70% of family-owned businesses either fail or
are sold before the second generation gets a chance to take over.3 And
only 10% remain active, private companies by the time the third genera-
l. ELIZA3ETHi KNOWLES, shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations, from, Tim
OXFORD DICIrIONARY OF PIHASE- AN) FABLE (2006), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/
10214-shrtslvstshrtslvsnthrgnrt.html [https://perma.cc/6H43-V98G].
2. See, e.g., George Stalk & Henry Foley, Avoid the Traps That Can Destroy Family
Businesses, HARV. Bus. Riw., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 27.
3. Id. at 25.
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tion is ready to step in.4 In light of these statistics, perhaps it is unsurpris-
ing there is an equivalent for "shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves" across many
different languages and cultures. In Italy, the saying is "dale stalle alle
stelle alle stalle"-"from the stalls to the stars back to the stalls."' 5 In Mex-
ico, "Padre bodeguero, hijo caballero, nieto pordiosero"-"Father
merchant, son gentleman, grandson beggar."'6
Passing family wealth down through the generations is fraught with ob-
stacles. On the one hand, there is the unavoidable risk inherent in any
kind of business or investment. On the other hand, there are also more
"personal" risks, such as profligacy or lack of work ethic among later gen-
erations of family members. 7 In the case of so-called "ultra-high-net-
worth" individuals, defined as persons with net worth over $30 million,8
successful multi-generational wealth transfer can be especially complex.
Today's marketplace presents these individuals with countless investment
options and strategies, as well as countless money managers vying for
their business. The solution that some ultra-high-net-worth individuals
embrace is to create their own "family office," a private investment firm
that exclusively manages their family's wealth, often with a long-term,
multi-generational perspective. A 2010 study estimated that there are
roughly 2,500 to 3,000 family offices in the United States, with over $1.2
trillion in assets under management. 9 Families who elect to open a family
office justify the significant time and expense required with the ability it
allows them to more directly oversee their investments.' 0 In addition, a
family office may better allow integration of other important priorities,
such as estate planning, tax planning, and philanthropic planning.'1 A
family office may also promote a common ethos and sense of family to-
getherness that can be passed down to future generations, something that
could prove to be a profound intangible benefit for the family.12
4. Id.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id. In Lancashire, where the English version of the phrase originated, it was said
"there's nobbut three generations atween a clog and clog"-a reference to the wooden
shoes worn by peasants. Id.; Richard M. Segal, Shirt Sleeves to Shirt Sleeves in Three Gener-
ations, CoizP!, (July 1, 2008), http://www.corpmagazine.com/special-interests/family-busi-
ness/shirt-sleeves-to-shirt-sleeves-in-three-generations/ [https://perma.cc/GL2J-QGDV]. In
Brazil, the saying is "Pai rico, filho nobre, neto pobre" ("Rich father, noble son, poor
grandson"). In China, "Fu bu guo san dai" ("Wealth never survives three generations"). Id.
In Spain, "Quien no lo tiene, lo hace; y quien lo tiene, lo deshace"-"The one who doesn't
have it, does it; and the one who has it, undoes it." Stalk & Foley, supra note 2 (author's
translation).
7. FAMILY OFICE EXCHANGE, FOX GUIDE TO TIIu PROFESSIONAL FAMILY OFFICE
4 (2014).
8. Kil3Y RosPLOCK, TIHE COMPLIETE FAMILY OiFCE HANDBOOK: A GuiE iOR
AFFLUENT FAMILIES AND TiHl AIVISORS WllO SIRVi- TinE-M 2 (2014) (noting that "ultra-
high-net-worth individuals" are individuals with over $30 million in net assets).
9. Pamela J. Black, The Rise of the Multi-Family Office, FINANCIAL PLANNING (Apr.
27, 2010) (data based on a study of single family offices conducted by the Family Wealth
Alliance).
10. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 49.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 10-11.
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This article focuses on the regulation of family offices under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act" or the "Act"), specifically
the definitional exclusion now provided to family offices under Advisers
Act Section 202(a)(11)(G) and Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 (the
"Family Office Rule" or the "Rule"). 13 Because a family office advises its
family clients regarding investment in securities, the office will be subject
to the requirements of the Advisers Act, including registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), unless it can satisfy the
requirements of the Family Office Rule. This article explains the Family
Office Rule in detail, so that family offices and the practitioners who
serve them can fully understand its requirements and thereby avoid appli-
cation of the Advisers Act.
This article is divided in to three main sections. Section I explores fam-
ily offices in general, including the ways in which they are typically
formed, the services they provide for families, and the ways in which they
are typically governed. Section II provides an overview of the Advisers
Act, to put the Family Office Rule in context. Section III is the core of
this article and focuses on the regulation of family offices under the Ad-
visers Act. Section III-A discusses the regulation of family offices before
2010, when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act," or "Dodd-Frank").
Section III-B discusses Section 409 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which created
the definitional exclusion from the Advisers Act for family offices and
directed the SEC to promulgate a rule defining "family office." Section
III-C explores in depth the SEC's Family Office Rule, which lays out the
detailed requirements family offices must satisfy to qualify for the
exclusion.
While this article fully supports the policy behind the Family Office
Rule, of allowing families to conduct their personal investment activities
privately and free of Advisers Act regulation, this article is critical of the
SEC's narrow interpretation of the Family Office Rule's "control" re-
quirement. The staff of the SEC Division of Investment Management cur-
rently interprets the Rule to require a majority of a family office's board
of directors to be family members, even though the Rule's text does not
compel such an interpretation. This article argues that the SEC should
broaden its interpretation of the control requirement to allow family of-
fices to use the governance structure that best suits their particular needs,
including a board of directors consisting of a majority of non-family
members.
I. FAMILY OFFICES: IN GENERAL
Family offices are almost always the result of a family's business suc-
cess rather than its origin. They are typically founded by one or more
13. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(G), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G)
(2015) [hereinafter Advisers Act]; Family Offices, Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-I, 17
C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-I (2015).
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family members who have succeeded in some type of business, whether it
be manufacturing, retail, energy, real estate, finance, technology, or con-
ceivably any other industry sector. When a family member attains wealth
that is liquid, often as the result of a partial or complete sale of the busi-
ness, he (or she) faces the decision of how to invest this newfound liquid-
ity. 14 Modern portfolio theory holds he should invest in a broad portfolio
of diverse assets.' 5 For example, a professional wealth manager might
recommend he invest certain percentages of his portfolio in stocks,
bonds, and alternative assets, such as real estate or hedge funds. The
wealth manager would also recommend diversification within each of
these asset classes, such as (in the case of bonds) certain allocations to
U.S. government bonds, investment grade corporate bonds, noninvest-
ment grade "junk" bonds, and so on. The purpose of investment diversifi-
cation is to provide the investor with the lowest level of risk possible for
their desired level of return. 16
The family member in our example, who we can think of as the family
office's "founder," has many options for how to implement this wealth
diversification strategy. Like many people in his position, the founder
may delegate the task to a financial institution, such as a bank or trust
company. Alternatively, assuming the founder still owns and controls an
operating business, he could delegate investment responsibility to certain
staff of the business, such as the chief financial officer.' 7 Finally, if the
founder has attained a level of wealth that is large enough, he may elect
to open his own "family office," a new and separate company that will
oversee his investments and other aspects of his financial life. If the
founder and the investment team he assembles succeed in preserving and
growing his wealth, then it is likely the founder will eventually choose to
transfer some or all of this wealth to his children or grandchildren. These
succeeding generations may then continue to have their assets managed
by the family office, eventually transferring it to their own descendants,
and so on. If this cycle continues, it is possible that the family office could
last quite a long time indeed-perhaps even longer than the family's orig-
inal operating business in the first place.
The firm described in the preceding paragraph is the prototypical fam-
ily office, founded by the same individual who started the family's origi-
nal operating business. But family offices can also be founded by later
generations of family members. Like families themselves, no two family
offices are completely alike. As one writer remarked, "if you've seen one
14. RAPIAEL AMrIT 1-1 AL., WlAIIARTON GLOBAL FAMILY ALLIANCE, SINGLE FAMILY
OFFICES: PRIVATE WIAI.TH MANAGEMENT IN THE FAMILY CONTEXT 6 (2008) ("While
some families continue to run their core operating business or other businesses, other fami-
lies with SFOs have had a 'liquidity event' and are now focused only on managing invest-
ment assets."). In the survey the Wharton report was based on, 58% of the families
surveyed remained involved in operating businesses. Id.
15. See, e.g., Zvi Bol)I, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 197-225 (9th
ed. 2011).
16. Id.
17. FAMILY OFFICIE EXCHANGE, supra note 7, at 3.
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family office, you've seen one family office."' 18 Customizability is the hall-
mark of family offices. The Family Office Exchange, a membership or-
ganization of family offices, highlights this in its definition of a "family
office" as "a unique family business that is created to provide tailored
wealth management solutions in an integrated fashion while promoting
and preserving the identity and values of the family."'19
Because family offices adapt to a family's unique characteristics, they
vary widely in their assets under management, number of family clients,
number of employees, and governance structure. Family offices also vary
in terms of the services they provide to their client families. Many provide
an array of services besides investment management, such as budgeting
and accounting, tax planning, estate planning, bill paying, and philan-
thropic planning.20 Some family offices also provide services of a more
personal nature, such as managing family members' residences, travel
planning, or managing certain luxury assets.21 Even where family offices
are not able to provide a particular service directly, they often coordinate
with outside firms so the family can receive the benefits of that service.22
Because family offices are "driven purely by the needs and preferences of
the underlying family, there is no standard for how one should be
structured. " 23
The kind of family office we have discussed, an office that manages the
wealth and affairs of a single family, is often referred to in the financial
industry as a "single family office," or "SFO." 24 "Multi-family offices," or
"MFOs," are also an option for ultra-high-net-worth individuals to con-
sider. What distinguishes multi-family offices is they are typically third-
party-owned wealth management firms that serve multiple different fami-
lies and charge a management fee.25 Most often, a multi-family office is
owned by a financial institution such as a bank, trust company, or invest-
ment company, but the office could also be owned by its management.26
Fundamentally, multi-family offices are simply "an extension of the cur-
rent ubiquitous wealth management model," but where the firm seeks to
add additional value by providing some of the same services as single
family offices.27 Multi-family offices may be an attractive option for fami-
lies who either do not have enough investable assets to justify opening
18. RosPLOCK, supra note 8, at 8.
19. FAMILY OFFIcE EXCHANGE, supra note 7, at 3.
20. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 9; see also Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,754 (Oct. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Release No.
IA-3098].
21. RosPl.OCK, supra note 8, at 9; Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,754.
22. See ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 16.
23. Russ Alan Prince, What Is a Family Office?, FORBE.S (May 22, 2013), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/20 3/05/22/what-is-a-family-office/#990672b 038c [https://
perma.cc/K9BL-ERQK].
24. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 41. Because this article is concerned only with single
family offices, it usually refers to them simply as "family offices."
25. Id. at 55.
26. Id. at 56.
27. Prince, supra note 23.
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their own single family office, or who simply do not wish to expend the
considerable time and effort required. Multi-family offices vary greatly in
terms of their size: some manage wealth on behalf of over 500 families,
while others manage wealth on behalf of only two or three.28
The considerable investment single family offices require is one of their
inherent limitations. Estimates vary on the level of investable assets fam-
ily offices need to be economically viable, and the topic is a subject of
some debate among family wealth consultants. 29 One family wealth ex-
pert put the number at $200 to $300 million, while another put it as high
as $500 million to $1 billion. 30 Experts agree that the level of assets re-
quired is higher than it used to be, due to the uncertainty following the
2008 recession and increases in overhead and compliance costs. 31 It is
important to note, however, that these estimates are merely that: there
are many family offices with investable assets in the range of $50 to $200
million that identify themselves as family offices and perform the same
functions as their larger peers, only on a smaller scale. 32
Because family offices are by their very nature private, it is difficult to
obtain accurate information about the family office "sector" as a whole. 33
Estimates of the number of family offices in the United States are there-
fore inherently imprecise.34 The Family Office Exchange estimates that
over 3,000 U.S. families have an independent single family office, and at
least twice that number have a family office housed within their private
operating company. 35 A 2010 study by the Family Wealth Alliance esti-
mated there were between 2,500 and 3,000 single family offices, with a
whopping $1.2 trillion in assets under management.36 The same study es-
timated there were approximately 150 multi-family offices, with over $400
billion in assets under management. 37
Given their highly customizable nature, family offices do not conform
to any particular mold when it comes to leadership and governance.
Some family offices are led by a family member, while others are led by a
28. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 53.
29. Id. at 8-9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id.
33. AMrr ET AL., supra note 14, at 4 (acknowledging that family offices' "promise of
exclusivity, privacy, and customization" "make SFOs increasingly attractive to the super
rich, but they also make it particularly difficult for researchers to understand their opera-
tions, their abilities, and their achievements"); Black, supra note 9 ("Single-family offices
are hard to track because they seek privacy and most are quite unique, 'born' as they are
within a family business and shaped by that particular business and that particular
family[.]").
34. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 6 ("How many affluent families are utilizing the ser-
vices of a family office? The short answer is that we do not know precisely, due primarily to
privacy, anonymity, and exclusivity requirements of the family office and how and if a
family identifies as having a family office.").
35. Id. at 7.





non-family professional. Some have a board of directors, while others do
not. According to a 2008 study by the Wharton Global Family Alliance
(the "Wharton Study"), certain patterns in governance emerge based on
the amount of the family office's assets and whether or not the "first gen-
eration" is still involved. 38 The Wharton Study found that 43% of U.S.-
based family offices were run by a family member in the position of CEO
or the equivalent. 39 Of those family offices with over $1 billion in assets,
however, only 27% were headed by a family member. 40 The percentage
was more than double-at 55%-for family offices with less than $1 bil-
lion under management. 4' Forty-six percent (46%) of "first generation"
family offices were run by a family member, while only 37% of later gen-
eration firms had a family member in the top position.42 This data sug-
gests that the more assets the family office has, and the more generations
of the family that have elapsed, the less likely the family office is to be
run by a family member.
A similar pattern emerges with respect to a family office's board gov-
ernance. Fifty-four percent (54%) of billionaire family offices have a
board of directors, while only 25% of millionaire family offices use a
board structure.43 Later generation family offices are also more likely to
have a board than first generation offices, with 54% of such firms using a
board as compared to only 29% of first generation offices. 44 The Wharton
Study explains, "When the wealth creator is present, decisions are typi-
cally made by him or her, with little reliance on governance committees.
However, when that founder (first generation) is no longer present the
family is forced to create more inclusive governance mechanisms.' '45
Family office governance structures are as idiosyncratic as families them-
selves. But the Wharton Study suggests that family offices that are either
larger or older tend to embrace more formalized governance practices.
Given this leadership and governance data, it is perhaps no surprise
that family members in first generation family offices tend to be more
"hands on" with their investments than family members in later genera-
tion offices. Among the first generation firms surveyed in the Wharton
Study, 37% of these families requested reports on a monthly basis, 31%
requested them on a quarterly basis, and 11% requested updates on a
weekly basis. 46 Meanwhile, none of the family members in the later-gen-
eration firms requested weekly updates, and 19% of these families re-
quested updates only twice per year.47 According to the Wharton Study,
"[t]he larger and more diffused a family becomes, the more likely the
38. AMIT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id.




family will be disengaged from its family office."'48
In light of the diversity among family offices, it can be difficult to draw
overarching conclusions about them. With that said, what all family of-
fices ultimately have in common is that they provide a customized wealth
management solution for their family clients. Most often, family offices
invest with a long-term, "patient capital point of view."'49 As one family
office expert put it, family offices are in the "stay rich versus get rich"
business, focusing on "wealth preservation rather than on wealth
accumulation. '5
II. THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
One of a family office's primary functions is to advise its family clients
regarding investment in securities. Given this advisory role, a family of-
fice would ordinarily fall under the extensive regulatory regime of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This section discusses the Advisers Act
in general terms so that the reader can better understand and appreciate
the significance of being excluded from it. Because the primary and sec-
ondary literature on the Advisers Act is extensive this section merely pro-
vides a broad overview of the Act.
The Advisers Act governs individuals and businesses that are in the
business of purveying advice or reports related to investment in securi-
ties.51 Congress enacted the Advisers Act in 1940 in response to an SEC
report documenting the proliferation of abusive practices in the bur-
geoning investment advisory industry. 52 Such practices included invest-
ment "tipster services" that often dealt in unsubstantiated claims,
performance-based fees that encouraged advisers to take excessive risk
with client funds, and investment advisers possessing the unilateral ability
to assign their client contracts. 53 In addition, the report found problems
with investment advisers' solvency and custody of client funds.54 Because
investment advisers did not meet the definitions of either "broker" or
"dealer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 Congress found
additional legislation necessary and passed the Advisers Act.56
As originally enacted, the Advisers Act required investment advisers to
register with the SEC, prohibited performance-based fees, and required
the inclusion of non-assignment provisions in all investment advisory con-
48. Id. at 18.
49. ROSPLOCK, supra note 8, at 50.
50. Id.
51. See Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(G), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-18c (2015).
52. 1 INVESTMENT ADVISER Ri2GULATION § 1:3 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3d ed. 2011).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)-(5) (2013).
56. TiHOMAS LIE HAZEN, 7 LAW OF SECURIMEs REGULATION § 21.1 (2015).
2016]
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tracts.57 In addition, the Act included a broad anti-fraud provision.58 In
spite of these steps, commentators describe the Advisers Act's initial
scope as relatively modest and as imposing relatively few new substantive
requirements. 59 In ensuing years, however, the Advisers Act was
amended on numerous occasions to keep pace with the rapidly expanding
investment advisory industry and perceived lapses in investor protections.
Among other things, these amendments required investment advisers to
maintain certain books and records, which the SEC has the right to rou-
tinely inspect.60 The most recent major amendment of the Advisers Act
was in 2010 with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to
bring hedge funds under the purview of the Act by requiring many previ-
ously-unregistered investment advisers to register with the SEC.61 As it
stands today, the Advisers Act and its accompanying rules and regula-
tions present a substantial and complex body of regulation.
A. THE DEFINITION OF "INVESTMENT ADVISER"
To understand the implications of the Advisers Act, it is first necessary
to understand who or what is an "investment adviser" under the Act.
Section 202(a)(11) of the Act defines "investment adviser" as:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of ad-
vising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities[.] 62
SEC interpretive releases have construed this definition as consisting of
three distinct elements: An "investment adviser" is one who (1) provides
advice, or issues reports or analyses, regarding investment in securities;
(2) is in the business of providing such services; and (3) provides such
services for compensation. 63 This section briefly examines each element.
57. 1 INVESTMENTr ADvIsRiz RiEGuLATION, supra note 52, § 1:3; see Advisers Act
§§ 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2015) (requiring any non-exempt "investment adviser" to
register with the SEC), 205(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2015) (prohibiting any investment advi-
sory contract entered into, extended, or renewed on or after the effective date of the Act
which provides for compensation to the investment adviser based on a share of capital
gains or capital appreciation, or which allows the assignment of the contract by the invest-
ment adviser without the approval of the other party to the contract).
58. 1 INVESTMENT ADVISER RIEGULATION, supra note 52, § 1:3; see Advisers Act
§ 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2015).
59. 1 INVESTMENT AuvisEiz REGULATION, supra note 52, § 1:3.
60. See id.; Advisers Act § 204(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2015).
61. 1 INVESTMENT AiViSER REGUL^rTION, supra note 52, § 1:3; see Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403(2), 124 Stat. 1376,
1571 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (repealing the "private adviser" exemption
under former Advisers Act section 203(b)(3)).
62. Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1) (2015).
63. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Con-
sultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component
of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg.
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Release No. IA-1092]; see also Gregory S.
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First, an investment adviser is one who provides advice, analysis, or
reports with respect to investment in securities, "the value of securities"
or "the advisability of investing, purchasing, or selling securities. '64 These
broad terms clearly encapsulate giving advice to buy, sell, or hold specific
securities, but the SEC has also interpreted these terms to include a wider
array of securities-related advice, such as advice to buy, sell, or hold cer-
tain categories of securities; market-timing advice regarding switching be-
tween securities investment alternatives; and advice regarding the merits
of investing in securities as opposed to non-security alternatives. 65 One
industry treatise conceives of this first element as requiring the exercise
of "judgment" by the adviser, because the adviser must in some way ac-
tively advise the client regarding securities investment decisions. 66 Merely
providing investors with administrative support or "back office" services,
such as accounting or record-keeping, will not cause the definition to ap-
ply. 67 Further, in numerous contexts where a person has merely aggre-
gated securities data for an investor's use, without providing any
investment evaluation or recommendation, the SEC has found the person
not to be an "investment adviser. '68
Because judgment is the determinative factor, the giving of advice to
investors regarding the selection of other, third-party investment advisers
will also cause the advice-giver to be an investment adviser.6 9 If, on the
other hand, the advice-giver merely provides an investor with a list con-
taining a broad cross-section of pre-screened advisers and the advice-
giver has no real interest in which adviser is selected, then the advice-
giver will not meet the definition of an investment adviser.70 Similarly, a
firm that matches investors and entrepreneurs in exchange for a nominal
fee but which does not provide advice with regard to the advisability of
particular investments or investment strategies will also be excluded from
Crespi, The Reach of the Federal Registration Requirements for Broker-Dealers and Invest-
ment Advisers, 17 SEc. REG. L.J. 339, 360-61 (1990).
64. Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2015). Note that "security" is a de-
fined term under Advisers Act section 202(a)(18); see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18). The defini-
tion is identical to that contained in section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). Because the ways in which the term "security" has been interpreted
from time to time by the SEC and the courts is not the focus of this article, the subject is
not addressed here.
65. 1 INVESTMENT ADVISER REoULATION, supra note 52, § 2:2.2[B]; see also Crespi,
supra note 63, at 361 ("Advice need not relate to specific securities to qualify as advice
'regarding securities'; even general advice regarding the advisability of investing in securi-
ties as opposed to other types of investments is sufficient, and advice as to the selection or
retention of an investment manager may also be sufficient.").
66. 1 INV[SrMiPNT ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 52, § 2:2.2[B].
67. Id.
68. Id.; Crespi, supra note 63, at 361 (citing Dayton Area Bldg. & Constr. Indus.
Found., SEC No Action Letter, 1987 WL 107960 (May 7, 1987)) ("[A] person who only
transmits reports or analyses concerning securities without commenting on the information
transmitted need not register.").





Second, an "investment adviser" is one who is engaged "in the busi-
ness" of providing securities investment advice or issuing analyses or re-
ports concerning securities. To satisfy this requirement, the provision of
securities investment advice or reports does not have to be a person's
principal business activity, or even constitute a significant portion of their
business activities. Rather, the SEC has said whether someone is engaged
in the "business" of providing investment advice depends on all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances, such as whether the person "[hlolds himself
out as an investment adviser or as one who provides investment advice,"
whether they receive any "separate or additional compensation that rep-
resents a clearly definable charge for providing advice about securities,"
and whether they provide investment advice "on anything other than
rare, isolated, and non-periodic instances. '72 If the person provides secur-
ities-related advice or reports on any kind of a regular basis, regardless of
how frequently such advice or reports are given, then the "business" ele-
ment will be satisfied.73
Third, the advice, analysis, or report must be offered in exchange for
"compensation." Such compensation can take the form of "any economic
benefit," whether an advisory fee, a commission, a combination of fees
and commissions, or any other arrangement. 74 Payments made in ex-
change for advisory services do not necessarily have to be separately
itemized or broken out from the charges for other services in order to
create an investment advisory relationship.75 Nor does payment necessa-
rily have to be made by the actual recipient of the advice, as payments
made by a third party will still cause the definition to apply.76 With that
said, if someone provides investment advice without receiving any form
of compensation, then that person will not be an "investment adviser"
under the Act.77
The Act's definition of "investment adviser" is sweeping, but the defi-
nition's application is narrowed by several enumerated exclusions. 78
These exclusions include publishers of bona fide news publications; advis-
ers whose advice, analyses, and reports relate only to U.S. government
securities; banks, except for divisions providing investment advice to reg-
istered investment companies; and certain financial rating organiza-
71. Crespi, supra note 63, at 361 (citing Evanston Bus. Inv. Corp., SEC No Action
Letter, 1987 WL 108022 (Apr. 27, 1987)).
72. Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Crespi, supra note 63, at 362-63.
75. Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg. at 38,403.
76. THOMAS P. LEMKE & GEIi.ALiD T. LINs, REGULATION OF INVESTMENr ADVISERS
§ 1:4 (2015) (citing Warren H. Livingston, SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15350 (March
8, 1980)).
77. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 21.2[1l][A] (citing Dominion Res., Inc., SEC No Action
Letter, 1985 WL 54428 (July 23, 1985)).
78. See Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2015).
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tions. 79 Professionals such as lawyers, accountants, engineers, teachers,
brokers, and dealers are also excluded from the definition, so long as the
"performance of such [investment advisory] services is solely incidental to
the practice of [their] profession. ' 80 Subsection (G) of the definition ex-
cludes "any family office, as defined by rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission, in accordance with the purposes of this title[.]"81 In addi-
tion, the statute gives the SEC the broad authority to exclude persons it
finds to be "not within the intent" of the definition, by rule, regulation, or
order.8 2 Importantly, all these various categories of excluded persons
under Section 202(a)(11) fall outside the scope of the Advisers Act alto-
gether, as opposed to merely being exempt from registration with the
SEC.8 3 A definitional exclusion is therefore more advantageous than ex-
emption from registration, as it frees the person or company from having
to comply with the Act entirely.
B. THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
At the core of the Advisers Act is the registration requirement.84 Un-
less the investment adviser qualifies for an exemption from registration
or is instead required to register with a state securities commission, it
must register with the SEC.8 5 Advisers register by filing Form ADV and
paying a nominal registration fee. 86 Form ADV requires disclosure of ba-
sic information about the adviser, including "the adviser's various trade
names, principal places of business, basis for registration, the identity of
person who controls the adviser, how the adviser's operations are fi-
nanced, the number and size of the adviser's ... clients, the disciplinary
background of the adviser, the types of advisory services provided," and
the various fees charged by the adviser, among other items.8 7 If the ad-
viser is a company, then the company itself must register, not the ad-
viser's officers or employees.88
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G).
82. Id. § 80b-2(a)(l1)(H).
83. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 21.2[2][A].
84. Advisers Act § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2015) (Subject to the exceptions con-
tained in the Act, "it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, unless registered under
this section, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce in connection with his or its business as an investment adviser.").
85. See id. § 80b-3(b) (enumerating exemptions from the Advisers Act); id. § 80b-3(a)
(requiring certain investment advisers to register with state securities commissions in lieu
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
86. Advisers Act Rule 203-1(a), (d), 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1(a), (d) (2015). Registration
fees are currently "$40 for advisers with assets under management under $25 million; $150
for advisers with assets under management from $25 million to $100 million; and $225 for
advisers with assets under management of $100 million or higher." Order Approving In-
vestment Adviser Registration Depository Filing Fees, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,097, 82,097-98
(Dec. 22, 2010).
87. LEMKE & LINS, supra note 76, § 1:71-72.
88. 1 INVESTMENT A1VISER REGULATION, supra note 52, § 1:3.1.
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After the adviser has filed Form ADV, the SEC has forty-five days in
which to either grant the application or institute proceedings to deter-
mine if there are grounds to deny it.89 Registration is not a merit review.
Rather, it is a review to determine whether the adviser's application for
registration was complete; whether the adviser is eligible for federal regis-
tration or must instead pursue state registration; and whether the adviser
or one of its employees has performed one of the acts prohibited under
Section 203(e), such as making a false statement to the SEC, willfully
violating federal or state securities laws, committing a securities-related
crime, or committing a non-securities related crime punishable by impris-
onment for one year or longer. 90 The SEC must generally make the ad-
viser's registration statement publicly available, and the adviser is
required to give all clients Part 2 of the Form ADV, often referred to as
the adviser's "brochure." 91
There are numerous exemptions from registration available under the
Advisers Act, although these exemptions have become more limited after
the passage of Dodd-Frank. Some of these exemptions include "adviser[s]
whose only clients are insurance companies," "foreign private adviser[s]"
who have fewer than fifteen clients in the United States and meet other
requirements, and certain charitable organizations. 92 Dodd-Frank's larg-
est impact on the investment adviser registration regime was its elimina-
tion of the so-called "private adviser" exemption under former Section
203(b)(3). 93 Under this exemption, an investment adviser was exempt
from registration so long as it had fewer than fifteen clients (i.e. fourteen
clients or less) during the preceding year, did not hold itself out to the
public as an investment adviser, and did not act as an investment adviser
to a registered investment company or business development company. 94
Advisers to large private funds, such as hedge funds and private equity
funds, were often able to rely on this exemption, since under then-Rule
203(b)(3)-1, each fund under advisement counted as only one client, re-
gardless of its number of beneficial owners. 95 Many family offices were
also able to take advantage of this exemption if they managed funds on
behalf of fewer than fifteen family members or entities.96
As a result of Dodd-Frank's elimination of the private adviser exemp-
tion, most large private advisers became required to register as invest-
ment advisers with the SEC. Dodd-Frank did, however, carve out a new
89. Advisers Act § 203(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(2) (2015).
90. Id. § 80b-3(c)(2), (e).
91. Id. § 80b-10; Advisers Act Rule 204-3 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3 (2006); see also 1 IN-
VEST[MEN' ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 52, § 1:3.1.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b); id. § 80b-2(a)(30) (defining "foreign private adviser").
93. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 403(2).
94. Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2011), repealed by Dodd-Frank
Act, supra note 61, § 403(2).
95. Advisers Act Rule 203(b)(3)-1,17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2015), repealed by
Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 403(2); see also Crespi, supra note 63, at 373; HAZEN,
supra note 56, § 21.2[1][D].
96. HAZEZN, supra note 56, § 21.2[3].
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exemption in Section 203(m) for advisers who have less than $150 million
in assets under management and who advise only "private funds," as that
term is defined in Section 202(a)(30). 97 The Act's definition of "private
fund" encompasses many private wealth funds such as hedge funds and
private equity funds, since in most cases these would be "investment com-
panies" under the Investment Company Act of 1940 but for certain exclu-
sions provided in that law. 98 Dodd-Frank also provided an exemption to
advisers solely to "venture capital funds," as that term is defined under
Rule 203(l)-1.99 Although advisers who qualify for the private fund ex-
emption under Section 203(m) or the venture capital fund exemption
under Section 203(l) are indeed exempt from registration, these advisers
are still subject to certain SEC reporting requirements. 100 For this reason,
these advisers are sometimes referred to as "exempt reporting
advisers."101
While SEC registration is central to the Advisers Act's regulatory
scheme, Dodd-Frank amended the Act to provide for state registration
instead of federal registration in many cases. In fact, some advisers are
specifically prohibited from registering with the SEC and instead must
register with the state or states where they conduct business. 10 2 So-called
"small advisers" with less than $25 million in assets under management
may only register with the states and are prohibited from registering with
the SEC.10 3 "Mid-sized advisers" with between $25 and $100 million
under management must register with the states, unless doing so would
require them to register with fifteen or more state securities commissions,
in which case they may register with the SEC.' 04 Advisers with more than
$100 million under management must register with the SEC and are not
97. Advisers Act § 203(m), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m) (2013) (providing an exemption from
registration to "any investment adviser of private funds, if each of [sic] such investment
adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under management in the
United States of less than $150,000,000"); id. § 80b-2(a)(29) (defining "private fund" as "an
issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 ... but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act"); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(m)-I ("Private Fund Adviser Exemption").
98. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l) (2011)
(Generally excluding from the definition of "investment company "issuer[s] whose out-
standing securities ... are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and
which are not making and do not... propose to make a public offering of its securities.");
id. § 80a-3(c)(7) (Generally excluding from the definition of "investment company" issuers
whose outstanding securities are purchased exclusively by "qualified purchasers," as that
term is defined in Company Act section 2(a)(51), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2011), and
which is not making or proposing to make a public offering of its securities.).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l); Advisers Act Rule 203(c)-1,17 C.F.R. § 275.203(l)-I (2012).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(/), (m)(2).
101. HAZEN, supra note 56, § 21.2[1][D].
102. Advisers Act § 203A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1) (2011).
103. Id.
104. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2) (2010). Inter-
estingly, mid-sized advisers with their principal place of business in New York or Wyoming
are not permitted to register with their state securities commission, and instead must regis-
ter with the SEC. The SEC has explained that this is because advisers based in these states
are not "subject to examination" by their state securities commission, as required under
Advisers Act section 203A(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B). Securities and Exchange
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required to register with the states. 0 5
While exemption from registration is advantageous for advisers from a
compliance and cost standpoint, it is important to remember that it does
not cause an adviser to be exempt from the other provisions of the Advis-
ers Act. This again highlights the important distinction between the defi-
nitional exclusions under Section 202(a)(11), including the exclusion for
"family offices," and the exemptions from registration under Section 203.
Advisers excluded from the very definition of "investment adviser" are
not subject to any of the Advisers Act's provisions, nor can they be sub-
ject to state registration, licensing or qualification requirements.10 6
C. OTHER REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS
The Advisers Act imposes voluminous ongoing filing and record-keep-
ing requirements on investment advisers. Advisers who are not exempt
from registration are required to file an annual updating amendment to
Form ADV.10 7 All advisers, both exempt and non-exempt from registra-
tion, are required to maintain detailed ongoing records, including all their
financial statements, all communications sent and received relating to in-
vestment advice or securities orders, and copies of all notices, letters, re-
ports, and advertisements distributed to more than ten clients.10 8 These
records are subject to examination at any time by the SEC.109 If an ad-
viser has custody of client funds or securities, it must also retain an inde-
pendent public accountant who will conduct a "surprise" examination of
the adviser at an undisclosed time during the fiscal year to review
whether the adviser is maintaining proper internal controls." 0
The Act also restricts how advisers may be compensated. The Act gen-
erally prohibits compensation that is directly based on a client's capital
gains or capital appreciation.' 1' The Act does, however, allow compensa-
tion based on the client's average total assets under management during a
defined period. In effect, therefore, advisers may indirectly receive com-
pensation on their clients' capital appreciation.' 1 2 In addition, the SEC
has promulgated other exceptions from the compensation restriction,
such as where advice is given to "qualified clients," who are generally
persons or companies having at least $1 million under management by
the adviser, having total net worth in excess of $2 million, or who are
Commission Division of Investment Management, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
Mid-Sized Advisers, 2011 WL 2557917 (June 28, 2011).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a); § 203A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1). The SEC has the
statutory authority to raise the $100 million threshold for federal registration by rulemak-
ing. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B)(ii)(lI).
106. Advisers Act § 203A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1)(B) (2011).
107. Advisers Act Rule 204-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-1 (2011).
108. Id. § 275.204-2.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2.
111. Advisers Act § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2011).
112. Id. § 80b-5(b).
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insiders of the adviser. 113
Section 206 is the Act's anti-fraud provision, the language of which is
based in part on Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.114 Section
206 prohibits any investment adviser "to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud any client or prospective client," "to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or
deceit upon any client or prospective client," or "to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative" as defined by SEC rule.1" 5 Section 206 also forbids investment
advisers from buying securities from their clients or selling securities to
their clients from their own account, unless they provide prior written
notice to the client and obtain the client's consent.'16 The Supreme Court
has held that investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.117
However, the Court has refused to recognize any private cause of action
under Section 206, holding that injured clients may only void their con-
tract with their adviser under Section 215.118 The SEC has broad author-
ity to enforce the Advisers Act through various means, such as by
suspending an adviser's registration, barring or suspending an individual
from associating with an investment adviser, and assessing monetary
penalties." 19
There are numerous other restrictions and requirements under the Ad-
visers Act that are beyond the scope of this article. We now turn to the
family office exclusion under the Advisers Act and the Family Office
Rule.
III. THE FAMILY OFFICE EXCLUSION
The term "family office" did not appear in the Advisers Act until the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Dodd-Frank paved the way for
the SEC to promulgate the Family Office Rule, which for the first time
provided a set of requirements for family offices to meet in order to ex-
clude themselves from the Advisers Act. Section III-A, below, discusses
how family offices could avoid regulation under the Advisers Act before
Dodd-Frank. Section III-B examines Section 409 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which created the definitional exclusion from the Advisers Act for family
113. Id.; Advisers Act Rule 205-3(d)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (2012).
114. HAZEZN, supra note 56, § 21.4[1][A].
115. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1), (2), (4).
116. Id. § 80b-6(3).
117. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979); SEC v. Capi-
tal Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (stating that the Advisers Act
"reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advi-
sory relationship"').
118. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24; Advisers Act § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (2012) ("Every
contract made in violation of any provision of this [Act] and every contract heretofore or
hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of
any relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this [Act,] or any rule, regula-
tion, or order thereunder, shall be void.").




offices and set out certain guidelines for the SEC to follow in defining the
term "family office."' 120 Section III-C comprehensively explores Advisers
Act Rule 202(a)(l1)(G)-1, the Family Office Rule ultimately promul-
gated by the SEC in June 2011.
A. BACKGROUND: REGULATION OF FAMILY OFFICES
BEFORE DODD-FRANK
Before the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, family offices avoided Ad-
visers Act regulation in one of two ways. The first way, previously dis-
cussed in Section II-B, was through the "private adviser" exemption of
former Section 203(b)(3). 121 This generally allowed a family office to be
exempt from registration so long as it had fewer than fifteen clients dur-
ing the preceding year and did not hold itself out to the public as an
investment adviser.122 While the latter requirement was typically easy for
family offices to satisfy, satisfying the "fewer than fifteen clients" require-
ment depended on the office's facts and circumstances. 123 If the office
served fewer than fifteen family members or entities, it could qualify for
the exemption. Former Advisers Act Rule 203(b)(3)-1 was helpful in this
regard, since it provided flexible standards for counting the number of
clients. Under the old rule, family offices could count as only one client a
natural person, that person's minor children, and that person's relatives
living at their principal residence. 24 Accounts and trusts for the benefit
of any of those persons could also be included.' 25 The rule also stated that
any business entity counted as one client, regardless of its number of ben-
eficial owners, and that entities with identical owners could be counted as
one client. 126 Finally, clients whom the family office provided with invest-
ment advice without receiving any compensation did not count as clients
at all.' 27 This last provision was particularly helpful for family offices, as
many do not charge their family clients for advisory services.1 28
120. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G) (excluding from the "investment adviser" definition
"any family office, as defined by rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, in accor-
dance with the purposes of this [title]"); see also Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 9, 2011) [hereinafter Release No. [A-
3220].
121. Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006), repealed by Dodd-Frank
Act, supra note 61, § 403(2).
122. Id.
123. 3 iNVVSrME*NT ADVIlSER REGULATION § 59.2 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3d ed. 2011).
124. Advisers Act Rule 203(b)(3)-1(a)(1),17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(1) (2006), re-
pealed by Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 403(2).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2).
127. Id. § 275.203(b)(3)-l (b)(4).
128. 3 INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 123, § 59.2 ("Because many
family offices receive their income in a manner that does not affect, directly or indirectly,
many of their clients, those family offices could rely on former Rule 203(b)(3)-1 to comply
with the requirements of former section 203(b)(3) because they had fewer than fifteen




If the family office was unable to take advantage of the Section
203(b)(3) safe harbor, it could still apply to the SEC for a special exemp-
tive order. The Act granted and continues to grant the SEC discretion to
exclude from the Act "by rules and regulations or order" any adviser it
finds to be "not within the intent" of the Act's definition of "investment
adviser."'1 29 The SEC typically granted these exemptive orders to family
offices liberally, under the rationale that family members who received
investment advice through their family office were not in need of the Ad-
visers Act's protections. 130 Interestingly, offices that received exemptive
orders became exempt from all of the Advisers Act's provisions, and not
just the registration requirement. 13' Family offices that received exemp-
tive orders were therefore arguably better off than offices that chose to
rely on the "private adviser" exemption from registration, although the
secondary literature does not suggest that this distinction was particularly
important to family offices in practice.
In spite of these two methods available for family offices to avoid the
Advisers Act, it seems that many of them still failed to utilize either of
them. In its final family office rulemaking, the SEC acknowledged what
had apparently been a widespread practice among family offices: "We are
troubled by comment letters we receive by counsel to some family offices
that appear to acknowledge that their clients were operating as unregis-
tered investment advisers, although they were not eligible for the private
adviser exemption and had not obtained an exemptive order from us."'t 32
The SEC's liberal granting of exemptive orders and its lack of enforce-
ment actions seems to have created an atmosphere in which family offices
perceived that the Act did not apply to them, even though "an adviser
may not 'rely' on exemptive orders issued to other persons. '"133
We next turn to Section 409 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which for the first
time provided a definitional exclusion from the Advisers Act specifically
for family offices.
B. DODD-FRANK SECTION 409
Because Dodd-Frank eliminated the "private adviser" exemption, 34
absent further statutory change family offices would have had no means
of exempting themselves from the Advisers Act other than by obtaining a
special exemptive order. To prevent such an outcome, Section 409 specifi-
cally excluded "family offices" from the definition of "investment ad-
129. See Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(H), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(H) (2013). This discre-
tionary exclusion provision was previously located in both subsections (F) and (G). Advis-
ers Act § 202(a)(11)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(F) (2000), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act,
supra note 61, § 403(2).
130. 3 INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULAIION, supra note 123, § 59.2.
131. Id.
132. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,986 n.6 (June 9, 2011).
133. Id.
134. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 403(2).
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viser.' ' 135 Section 409 laid out basic criteria for the SEC to follow in its
rulemaking and required the SEC to promulgate a definition of "family
office" that "is consistent with the previous exemptive policy of the Com-
mission, as reflected in exemptive orders for family offices in effect on the
date of enactment of this Act" and which would "recogniz[e] the range of
organizational, management, and employment structures and arrange-
ments employed by family offices."'1 36 Section 409 also included a grand-
father provision that mandated that no family office could be stripped of
exemption solely because it had provided investment advice to any of the
following before January 1, 2010: (1) an officer, director, or employee
who is an "accredited investor" under Regulation D of the Securities Act,
(2) a company owned exclusively and controlled by family members, or
(3) a registered investment adviser who advised the family office and co-
invested with the family office, so long as the co-invested funds are not
more than 5 percent of the family office's assets under management.' 37
While Section 409 erroneously read in terms of providing an "exemption"
from the Advisers Act, it in fact specifically provided a complete defini-
tional exclusion from the Act.
In its report issued on April 30, 2010, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs explained its rationale for the family
office exclusion. 138 As the only documented legislative history regarding
Section 409,139 the report provides the only insight into Congress's intent
in creating the exclusion:
Family offices provide investment advice in the course of managing
the investments and financial affairs of one or more generations of a
single family. Since the enactment of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, the SEC has issued orders to family offices declaring that those
family offices are not investment advisers within the intent of the Act
(and thus not subject to the registration and other requirements of
the Act). The Committee believes that family offices are not invest-
ment advisers intended to be subject to registration under the Advisers
Act. The Advisers Act is not designed to regulate the interactions of
family members, and registration would unnecessarily intrude on the
privacy of the family involved. Accordingly, Section 409 directs the
SEC to define "family office" and excludes family offices from the
definition of investment adviser [under] [sic] Section 202(a)(11) of
135. Id. § 409 ("Family Offices") (enacting Advisers Act section 202(a)(l1)(G), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G) (2013), excluding from the definition of "investment adviser"
"any family office, as defined by rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, in accor-
dance with the purposes of this title"). See infra Appendix 1 for the full text of section 409.
136. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 409(b)(1)-(2).
137. Id. § 409(b)(3). Notably, family offices exempted solely on the basis of this grand-
father provision were not exempted from the antifraud provisions under paragraphs (1),
(2), and (4) of Advisers Act section 206. Id. § 409(c).
138. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 75-76 (2010).
139. The House of Representatives' version of Dodd-Frank did not include any exclu-
sion for family offices, and the Conference Committee that reconciled the House and Sen-
ate versions did not publish a report. The legislative history of Section 409 from the Senate
bill is therefore the only published expression of Congress's intent in creating the exclu-
sion. 3 INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 123, § 59.2
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the Advisers Act. 140
As the committee report indicates, Congress believed investment ad-
visers engaged primarily in the management of a single family's wealth
were not intended to be regulated under the Advisers Act. The Commit-
tee stated its rationale in terms of respect for family privacy, but likely it
also had to do with a belief that members of what are typically financially
sophisticated families are not in need of the protections and safeguards
provided by the Act. The committee report went on to acknowledge the
frequent practice among family offices of allowing co-investment by non-
family insiders:
Section 409 directs the SEC to adopt rules of general applicability
defining "family offices" for purposes of the exemption. The rules
shall provide for an exemption that is consistent with the SEC's previ-
ous exemptive policy and that takes into account the range of organi-
zational and employment structures employed by family offices. The
Committee recognizes that many family offices have become profes-
sional in nature and may have officers, directors, and employees who
are not family members, and who may be employed by the family
itself or by an affiliated entity. Such persons (and other persons who
may provide services to the family office) may co-invest with family
members, enabling them to share in the profits of investments they
oversee, and better aligning the interests of such persons with those
of the family members served by the family office. The Committee
expects that such arrangements would not automatically exclude a
family office from the definition.1 41
Although the Committee's "expectations" regarding the SEC's
rulemaking were not technically binding on the agency, it appears they
were highly persuasive. 142 Of course, Section 409's requirement that the
final rule "recogniz[e] the range of organizational, management, and em-
ployment structures and arrangements employed by family offices" was
binding, as was the grandfather provision for family offices that allowed
co-investment by insiders in prior years.143 It is therefore unsurprising
that the SEC's final rule did give family offices wide latitude to allow for
co-investment by certain officers, directors, and employees.144 We now
examine the SEC's final rule under Section 202(a)(11)(G), defining the
term "family office."
140. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 75 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added).
142. See Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,758 (Oct. 12, 2010) (citing S.
REP. No. 111-76, at 75-76).
143. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, § 409(b)(2).
144. See Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-l(d)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-




C. THE FAMILY OFFICE RULE: ADVISERS Acr RULE 202(A)(11)(G)-I
Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1, more commonly known as the
"Family Office Rule," was promulgated by the SEC on June 22, 2011 in
SEC Release IA-3220 (the "Adopting Release"). 145 At over 1,500 words
and with nine defined terms, the Rule is surprisingly intricate and com-
plex.146 Subsection (b) of the Rule frames the definition of "family of-
fice" in terms of three fundamental requirements: (1) a "family client"
requirement, (2) an ownership and control requirement, and (3) a private
adviser requirement. The full text of subsection (b) is as follows:
(b) Family office. A family office is a company (including its direc-
tors, partners, members, managers, trustees, and employees acting
within the scope of their position or employment) that:
(1) Has no clients other than family clients; provided that if a
person that is not a family client becomes a client of the family
office as a result of the death of a family member or key em-
ployee or other involuntary transfer from a family member or key
employee, that person shall be deemed to be a family client for
purposes of this section for one year following the completion of
the transfer of legal title to the assets resulting from the involun-
tary event;
(2) Is wholly owned by family clients and is exclusively controlled
(directly or indirectly) by one or more family members and/or
family entities; and
(3) Does not hold itself out to the public as an investment
adviser. 147
The term "company" used in the opening clause is defined broadly in the
Advisers Act to include entities such as corporations, partnerships, trusts,
and "any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not."'1 4 8
For purposes of the exclusion, it therefore does not matter what type of
legal entity a family office utilizes. In fact, given the Act's flexible defini-
tion of "company," a family office could conceivably just be a division
within a family's operating business, so long as the business satisfies the
Rule's other requirements. 149 One commentator points out that the
phrase "has no clients other than," taken in context, can only mean "has
145. See Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,983 (June 9, 2011) (promulgating
Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1, the Family Office Rule, now codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1); see also Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,753 (proposing
the family office rule and seeking public comment). This article often refers to the Family
Office Rule simply as the "Rule."
146. See infra Appendix 2 for the complete text of the Family Office Rule.
147. Advisors Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-l Family Offices, 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(b) (Aug. 29, 2011).
148. Advisers Act § 202(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(5) (2013) ("'Company' means a
corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock corporation, a trust, or any organ-
ized group of persons, whether incorporated or not; or any receiver, trustee in a case under
Title 11 of the United States Code, or similar official, or any liquidating agent for any of
the foregoing, in his capacity as such.").
149. 3 INVESTMENT AIDVISER REGULATION, supra note 123, § 59.4.2.A.
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no [investment advisory] clients other than," since the giving of invest-
ment advice is the only activity the SEC can regulate under the Advisers
Act.150 A family office may therefore provide other services (e.g. tax, ac-
counting, etc.) to persons who are not "family clients" and still be eligible
for the exclusion. 151
We now analyze in detail each of the three requirements contained in
subsection (b) of the Rule.
1. The "Family Client" Requirement
The first requirement under subsection (b)(1) of the Family Office
Rule is that the family office "has no clients other than family clients." '1
52
Subsection (b)(1) also contains a one-year grace period in the case of
involuntary transfers to persons who are not "family clients."'1
53
The implications of the client requirement under subsection (b)(1)
hinge on the Rule's definition of "family client," a lengthy and complex
definition that itself contains several other defined terms.1 54 Distilled to
its fundamentals, a "family client" must be a "family member," "former
family member," "key employee," "former key employee," the estate of
one of these persons, a company owned and controlled by one or more of
these persons, or an affiliated trust or non-profit organization meeting
certain requirements. 155 This article does not explore all of the nuances
related to eligible trusts and non-profit organizations, but it analyzes the
other enumerated categories in detail.
a. Family Members
The first and most expansive enumerated category of persons included
in the definition of "family client" is "[a]ny family member." The Rule
defines a "family member" as:
[AII lineal descendants (including by adoption, stepchildren, foster
children, and individuals that were a minor when another family
member became a legal guardian of that individual) of a common
ancestor (who may be living or deceased), and such lineal descend-
ants' spouses or spousal equivalents; provided that the common an-
cestor is no more than 10 generations removed from the youngest
generation of family members. 156
150. Id.
151. Id. The SEC Staff has acknowledged this possibility, as well. See Staff Response to
Questions About the Family Office Rule, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at
Question IV.l (April 27, 2012) [hereinafter SEC Staff Q&A], http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/guidance/familyofficefaq.htm [https://perma.cc/M9UM-3RTD]. See infra Ap-
pendix 3 for selections from the Staff Q&A.
152. Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(1l)(G)-1(13)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(b)(1)
(2011).
153. Id.
154. See id. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 275.202(a)(l1)(G)-1(d)(6).
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In essence, a "family member" includes all the lineal descendants of a
common ancestor up to ten generations removed from that common an-
cestor, plus those lineal descendants' spouses or spousal equivalents. The
definition is very flexible in that it includes a lineal descendant's adopted
children, stepchildren, and foster children, as well as persons who were
minors when a lineal descendant became their legal guardian. As the def-
inition is worded, adopted children, stepchildren, and persons under
guardianship as minors retain their "family member" status even after
they reach the age of majority. 157
The Rule continues its flexible approach with regard to spouses, as it
includes not only spouses who are legally married to lineal descendants
but also "spousal equivalents," defined elsewhere in the Rule as "a co-
habitant occupying a relationship generally equivalent to that of a
spouse. ' 158 The SEC staff has explained that a "spousal equivalent" in-
cludes "same-sex domestic partners as well as opposite sex partners that
have determined not to marry even though they live together in a rela-
tionship generally equivalent to married couples."'1 59 Because the defini-
tion of "family member" is based on descent from a common ancestor, a
lineal descendant's in-laws are not included in the definition and there-
fore may not invest through the family office. 160
The Rule imposes a limit of ten generations between the common an-
cestor and the last generation of descendants. It is important to recognize,
however, that because the common ancestor himself is actually not in-
cluded in the definition of "family member," there are in effect only nine
generations between the oldest and youngest generations of "family
members." In the Adopting Release, the SEC explained it believed some
kind of generational limit was necessary in order to prevent abuse. 161
Without such a limiting principle, smaller commercial investment advi-
sory offices seeking to avoid registration could conceivably research their
clients' genealogy as far back as necessary in order to locate a remote
common ancestor and take advantage of the exclusion. 162 Without a
generational limit, multiple families could also join together to create a
multi-family office and qualify for the exclusion as long as they could
locate a remote common ancestor. The SEC has explained that the family
office exclusion is intended for single family offices only, so a genera-
157. This would not seem to be the case for foster children, who lose their foster status
when they reach majority age.
158. Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-l(d)(9),17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(d)(9)
(2011).
159. SEC Staff Q&A, supra note 151, at Question 111.3.
160. See id. at Question 111.1; 3 INVESTMENT ADVISER RiGcuIlATION, supra note 123,
§ 59.4.2.B.1.
161. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,985 (June 9, 2011).
162. Id. ("In order to prevent families from choosing an extremely remote ancestor,
which could allow commercial advisory businesses to rely on the rule, we are imposing a 10
generation limit between the oldest and youngest generation of family members. Such a
limit, suggested by several commenters, would constrain the scope of persons considered




tional limit was believed necessary in order to prevent such a practice. 163
Some commentators have criticized the ten generation limit as unduly
restrictive. 164 But the seeming harshness and arbitrariness of this limita-
tion is mitigated by two important factors. The first is the simple truth
that ten generations encompasses quite a long period of time. If a genera-
tion is measured as thirty years,165 then ten generations would allow for
300 years between the birth of the common ancestor and the birth of the
tenth generation. If that measure is shortened to twenty-five years, that
span of time is still 250 years. The second mitigating factor is that a family
office can re-designate its common ancestor at any time it desires.' 66
There is no formal process or filing necessary to make this re-designa-
tion.167 Nor is there any requirement for the designated common ances-
tor to have been the founder of the family office.168 The SEC specifically
chose a "common ancestor" approach over the "office founder" approach
it originally proposed in Release IA-3098 (the "Proposing Release") after
it received comment letters pointing out that the founder approach would
apply different limits to family offices depending on when they were
founded.169
A family office faces trade-offs depending on how far "up" or "down"
the chain of generations it selects a common ancestor. Selecting a com-
mon ancestor farther "up" the chain will allow the family office to serve a
greater number of "collateral" kindred, such as distant cousins.' 70 On the
other hand, choosing a common ancestor farther "down" the chain will
allow the family office to serve a greater number of current family mem-
163. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,756 (Oct. 12, 2010) ("The rule would
not extend to family offices serving multiple families. We have never granted an exemptive
order to a multifamily office declaring them not to be an investment adviser and thus in-
cluding them would seem to be inconsistent with our prior exemptive policy. Many multi-
family offices more resemble a typical commercial investment adviser appropriately
subject to the Advisers Act.").
164. See 3 INVESTMENT ADVISER REGUI ATION, supra note 123, § 59.4.2.B.1 ("The limi-
tation to ten generations is also unfortunate and will, over time, adversely affect every
family office whose family wealth was created by a common ancestor during the nineteenth
or early twentieth century.").
165. See generation, n., OxFoRi ENGLiSr- DICI'ONARY, Feb. 2, 2016, at 3(b), http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/77521 ?redirectedfrom=generation#eid [https://perma.cc/FP54-
BP4K] (defining "generation" as "[t]he average time it takes for children to grow up, be-
come adults, and have children of their own, generally considered to be about thirty years,
and used as a rough measure of historical time").
166. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,985 ("Under this approach, the family
office will be able to choose the common ancestor and may change that designation over
time such that the family office clientele is able to shift over time along with the family
members served by the family office.").
167. Id. at 37,985 n.27.
168. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,984-85.
169. Id. ("Some commenters also criticized our approach because it would treat who
could be a family member differently depending on when the family office was established.
For example, one commenter stated that our proposal would have allowed a family office
that was formed a long time ago to provide services to persons that [sic] are currently third
or fourth cousins to each other, but that a family office established today may need to wait
at least 40 or 50 years before being able to provide services to equivalent types of family
members.").
170. Id. at 37,985.
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bers' future lineal descendants. 171
b. Former Family Members
The next category of family client is "former family members. ' 172 This
definition is relatively straightforward: "a spouse, spousal equivalent, or
stepchild that was a family member but is no longer a family member due
to a divorce or other similar event."'1 73 In the case of divorce, a family
office may continue to serve former spouses and former stepchildren,
with no limit on the duration of time and no prohibition on the making of
new investments.' 74 It is unclear precisely what constitutes an "other sim-
ilar event" under the definition, but assumedly it encompasses marital
separation or, in the case of spousal equivalents, an ending of the
relationship.
Both the Rule and the Adopting Release are notably silent with regard
to the surviving spouses or surviving spousal equivalents of deceased lin-
eal descendants. Do these persons remain "family members" after the
lineal descendant's death, or do they become "former family members"?
The distinction is of no consequence, as in either case they preserve their
"family client" status.175 Because divorced spouses retain their ability to
invest through the family office, it seems all but certain that surviving
spouses and spousal equivalents retain that ability, as well.' 76
c. Key Employees
The Family Office Rule allows "key employees" to receive investment
advice from the family office. 177 As previously discussed, this was a con-
gressional priority reflected in the Senate Banking Committee's report,' 78
and before the passage of Dodd-Frank the SEC had issued exemptive
orders to family offices allowing such arrangements. 79 The SEC's ratio-
nale for including key employees as "family clients" was twofold: First,
given these employees' financial sophistication and insider status, they
should be able to protect themselves without the protections of the Ad-
171. Id.
172. Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1)(G)-l(d)(4)(ii)
(2011).
173. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(7).
174. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,986 (June 9, 2011) ("We had pro-
posed permitting former family members to retain any investments held through the family
office at the time they became a former family member, but to limit them from making any
new investments through the family office. Commenters pointed out that a former spouse's
financial arrangements often remain intertwined with those of the family, particularly if
they provide for children who remain family members. Some argued that stepchildren of a
divorced spouse may remain close to the family after the divorce. We are persuaded by
these arguments and have modified the definition of former family member to include
stepchildren.").
175. 3 INVESTMENr ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 123, § 59.4.2.B.2.
176. Id.
177. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,988-89.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 138-141.
179. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,758 n.40 (Oct. 12, 2010).
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visers Act.' 80 Second, family offices need the ability to allow co-invest-
ment by certain personnel in order to attract top talent and to align the
interests of the family with those of its employees. 181
"Key employee" is defined as:
[Any natural person (including any key employee's spouse or
spouse equivalent who holds a joint, community property, or other
similar shared ownership interest with-that key employee) who is an
executive officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving
in a similar capacity of the family office or its affiliated family office
or any employee of the family office or its affiliated family office
(other than an employee performing solely clerical, secretarial, or
administrative functions with regard to the family office) who, in
connection with his or her regular functions or duties, participates in
the investment activities of the family office or affiliated family of-
fice, provided that such employee has been performing such func-
tions and duties for or on behalf of the family office or affiliated
family office, or substantially similar functions or duties for or on
behalf of another company, for at least 12 months.1 82
The sheer length of the definition obscures the fact that it actually con-
tains two distinctly different categories of persons. The first category in-
cludes persons in a position of managerial authority, including executive
officers, directors, trustees, general partners, or similarly situated per-
sons.' 83 Some of these persons, such as directors and trustees, might not
actually be employed by the family office at all. The second category en-
compasses employees "who, in connection with [their] regular functions
or duties, participat[e] in the investment activities" of the office or affili-
ated office.' 84 These employees need not necessarily hold positions of
managerial authority, but they must not be administrative or clerical in
nature. Furthermore, they must have served in an investments-related
role for at least twelve months. 185 According to the Adopting Release,
this twelve-month requirement is a safeguard intended to limit participa-
180. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,990 ("Key employee receipt of family
office advice is permitted because their position and experience should enable them to
protect themselves and to allow family offices to attract talented investment professionals
as employees.").
181. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,758 ("Permitting participation by key em-
ployees allows such family offices to incentivize key employees to take a job with the fam-
ily office and to create positive investment results at the family office under terms that
could be available to them as employees of other types of money management firms. It is
our understanding that in some cases family offices may need to provide such incentives to
attract highly skilled investment professionals who may not otherwise be attracted to work
at a family office.").
182. Advisers Act Rule § 203(b)(3)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1l)(G)-l(d)(8) (2011).
183. "Executive officer" is defined broadly in the Rule to mean "the president, any vice
president in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as administration
or finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making function, or any other person
who performs similar policy-making functions, for the family office. Id.
§ 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(3).




tion to "those employees that are likely to be in a position or have a level
of knowledge and experience in financial matters sufficient to be able to
evaluate the risks and take steps to protect themselves.' 86 Interestingly,
these employees need not serve in an investments-related role for twelve
months at the family office itself. Rather, if they fulfilled "substantially
similar functions or duties for or on behalf of another company" for a
twelve month period, the Rule is satisfied.18 7
The definition of "key employee" encompasses not only the key em-
ployees of the family office, but also the key employees of an "affiliated
family office." As the term suggests, an "affiliated family office" is a sepa-
rate family office that is owned by family clients of the original family
office, is controlled by members of the same family, and satisfies the
Rule's requirements. 188 (The ownership and control requirements for
family offices are discussed in Section III-C.2, below.) The Rule allows
for such an arrangement because some families may have more than one
family office due to a variety of business, tax, or other structuring rea-
sons.'8 9 Allowing key employees of an affiliated family office to receive
investment advice from the family office therefore allows greater flexibil-
ity.190 The SEC declined to define "key employees" to include employees
of "family entities" (a term that captures companies wholly owned by
family clients, also discussed in Section II-C.2), as many family-owned
companies are operating businesses that do not specialize in invest-
ments. 19' As such, the SEC believed "[t]here is no reason to expect that
[key employees of family entities] have a level of knowledge and experi-
ence in financial matters sufficient to protect themselves without the pro-
tections afforded by the Advisers Act."' 92 For the same reason, the
agency refused to include the spouses of key employees, except insofar as
they have a joint property interest in the invested property.' 93
d. Former Key Employees
"Former key employees" are included as "family clients," "provided
that upon the end of [their] employment by the family office, [they] shall
186. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,990 (June 9, 2011); accord Release
No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,758.
187. Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G), 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-I(d)(8) (2011).
188. Advisers Act Rule § 203(b)(3)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1l)(G)-1(d)(1) (2011)
(defining "Affiliated Family Office" as "a family office wholly owned by family clients of
another family office and that is controlled (directly or indirectly) by one or more family
members of such other family office and/or family entities affiliated with such other family
office and has no clients other than family clients of such other family office").
189. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,989 n.88 ("Some commenters pointed out
that a family may establish more than one family office for tax or other structuring reasons
and recommended that the definition of key employee include employees of multiple fam-
ily offices that serve the same family.").
190. See id. at 37, 989.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 37, 990 ("There is no reason to believe that the key employee's spouse or
immediate family members independently have the financial sophistication and experience
to protect themselves when receiving investment advice from the family office.").
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not receive investment advice from the family office. .other than with
respect to assets advised (directly or indirectly) by the family office im-
mediately prior to the end of [their] employment[.]"' 94 The SEC decided
that after key employees terminate their employment with the family of-
fice, they may continue to keep their preexisting investments under the
family office's management. 195 This decision was motivated at least in
part by a desire to prevent adverse tax or investment consequences to the
former key employee.' 96 Former key employees may not enter in to any
new investments through the family office, except with regard to previous
contractual obligations related to preexisting investments. 197 The SEC
based this restriction on the belief that once the key employee departs
from the family office, the previous rationale that they do not require the
Advisers Act's protections no longer applies.' 98
e. Estates and Trusts
The inclusion of estates and certain trusts as "family clients" recognizes
the reality that families' estate plans are by necessity often intertwined
with the family office. Any estate of a family member, former family
member, key employee, or former key employee is included as a family
client.199 Any revocable trust that has one or more family clients as its
sole grantor or grantors is also permitted to be a family client.2°0 The
Rule focuses on the grantor of a revocable trust, as opposed to its benefi-
ciaries, because these beneficiaries "have no reasonable expectation of
obtaining any benefit from the trust until the trust becomes irrevocable
(generally upon the death of the grantor)." '201 Therefore, if persons other
than family clients are included as beneficiaries of a revocable trust, it
does not flout the policy behind the Family Office Rule.202
With regard to irrevocable trusts, the Rule does take the trust's current
beneficiaries in to consideration. An irrevocable trust will be a "family
194. Advisers Act Rule § 202(1)(11)(G)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(b)(4)
(2011).
195. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,990.
196. Id.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(iv).
198. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,990 ("We are including key employees as
family clients because their particular role in the family office causes us to believe that the
employee should be in a position to protect him or herself without the need for the protec-
tions of the Advisers Act. Once the employee is no longer in that role, this policy rationale
no longer holds true to the same degree.").
199. Advisers Act Rule § 203(a)(11)(G)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(d)(4)(vi)
(2011). Because "[t]he executor of an estate is acting in lieu of the deceased family client in
managing and distributing the family client's assets ... advice to the executor is equivalent
to providing advice to that family client." Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,987.
Because "former key employee" is not a defined term under the Rule, this subsection of
the Rule specifies that the estates of former key employees may be considered "family
clients" subject to the limitation on new investments contained in subsection (d)(4)(iv) of
the Rule. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(vi).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(l1)(G)-l(d)(4)(ix).




client" so long as all its current beneficiaries are family clients. 20 3 The
Adopting Release explains that the contingent beneficiaries of an irrevo-
cable trust need not be family clients for similar reasons as with revocable
trusts, and also because the contingent beneficiaries of an irrevocable
trust are often named specifically in case all of the trust's current benefi-
ciaries (the family members) are deceased. 204 The irrevocable trust's cur-
rent beneficiaries may also include "non-profit organizations, charitable
foundations, charitable trusts, or other charitable organizations," but only
if the irrevocable trust is "funded exclusively by one or more other family
clients. '20 5 Here, the SEC's broader decision pertaining to the inclusion
of non-profit and charitable organizations as "family clients" is
relevant. 206
f. Non-Profit Organizations, Charitable Foundations, and Charitable
Trusts
The Rule allows non-profit organizations, charitable foundations, char-
itable trusts, and other charitable organizations to qualify as family cli-
ents, so long as "all the funding such foundation, trust or organization
holds came exclusively from one or more other family clients. '20 7 In
other words, charitable entities that receive any funding from persons
other than family clients do not qualify. In the Adopting Release, the
SEC explained its rationale in terms of a non-family-funded non-profit
"lack[ing] the characteristics necessary to be viewed as a member of a
family unit": "Permitting such [non-family-funded] organizations to be
advised by a family office would be inconsistent with the exclusion's un-
derlying rationale that recognizes that the Advisers Act is not designed to
regulate families managing their own wealth. ' 208 The SEC did, however,
soften its initial proposal, which had required the charitable organization
or trust to also have been founded by family members.20 9 Now, "as long
as all the funding currently held by the charitable organization came
solely from [family] clients," the SEC explained, "the individuals or enti-
ties that originally established it are not of import for our policy
rationale. "210
g. Companies Wholly Owned by Family Clients
The final category of family client is "[a]ny company wholly owned (di-
rectly or indirectly) exclusively by, and operated for the sole benefit of,
203. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(d)(4)(vii).
204. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,987.
205. Advisers Act Rule § 202(a)(11)(G)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1)(G)-l(d)(4)(viii)
(2011).
206. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,988.
207. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(v).
208. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,988.




one or more other family clients[.] ' 211 Here, the "wholly owned" and
"operated for the sole benefit" requirements present a high hurdle: any
investment in the company by a non-family client will prevent it from
being a "family client" eligible to receive investment advice from the fam-
ily office. This category can be useful if the family's operating business
wishes to receive investment advice through the family office, or if family
clients create an entity in order to pursue a specific investment
opportunity.212
This concludes this article's examination of the various categories of
"family client" a family office may serve: family members, former family
members, key employees, former key employees (with regard only to
previously-committed and preexisting investments), certain estates and
trusts, non-profit organizations exclusively funded by other family clients,
and companies wholly owned by other family clients.
h. One-Year Grace Period for Involuntary Transfers
We now turn to the remainder of subsection (b)(1) of the Rule, which
provides a one-year grace period for investments by non-family clients
who "become a client of the family office as a result of the death of a
family member or key employee or other involuntary transfer from a
family member or key employee. '213 This grace period is intended to pre-
vent a family office from losing its excluded status simply because of an
involuntary transfer, such as a family client's bequest to a non-family
member of assets in a family office-advised private fund. 2 14 The Adopting
Release explains that the purpose of the one-year grace period is to
"permi[t] the family office to orderly transition that client's assets to an-
other investment adviser or otherwise restructure its activities to comply
with the Advisers Act."' 215 This one-year period is longer than the four-
month period originally proposed by the SEC.2 16 In spite of comment
letters arguing for an even longer or more flexible standard, the SEC in-
sisted that "relief for involuntary transfers must be temporary" because
"after several such bequests the office could cease to operate in any way
as a family office." '2 17
Now that we have discussed subsection (b)(1)'s restrictions on the type
of clients a family office is allowed to serve, we may turn to subsection
211. Advisers Act Rule § 202(a)(l1)(G)-l, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(l1)(G)-l(d)(4)(xi)
(2011). The full definition also provides "that if any such entity is a pooled investment
vehicle, it [must be] excepted from the definition of 'investment company' under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940." Id.
212. See 3 INVESTMENT ADVisIER REGULATION, supra note 123, § 59.4.2.B.6. In this
commentator's view, "the 'owned exclusively' and 'for the sole benefit of' conditions are
simply too stringent and not necessary in situations where a legitimate family office is not
attempting to give 'investment advice' to non-family members or non-family clients that
also own interests in the intermediate holding company." Id.
213. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(b)(1).






(b)(2)'s requirements for who is allowed to own and control a family
office.
2. The Ownership and Control Requirement
For a family office to be excluded from the Advisers Act, subsection
(b)(2) of the Rule requires the family office to be "wholly owned by fam-
ily clients" and "exclusively controlled (directly or indirectly) by one or
more family members and/or family entities[.] '2 18 Subsection (b)(2)'s
brevity belies its complexity and nuance. The requirements for the owner-
ship group and the control group are distinct, and the precise meaning of
"exclusively controlled (directly or indirectly)" is difficult to discern.
Subsection (b)(2) states that the family office must be wholly owned by
"family clients," the broad group of persons previously discussed above.
The family office must be "exclusively controlled," however, by only
"family members and/or family entities. '2 19 "Family members," as previ-
ously discussed, includes lineal descendants up to ten generations re-
moved from a common ancestor, plus their spouses and spousal
equivalents.2 20 The Rule defines "family entities" as the various estates,
trusts, non-profit organizations, and wholly-owned companies that are in-
cluded in the definition of "family clients," but "excluding key employees
and their trusts from the definition of family client solely for purposes of
this definition."'2 21 The control group is therefore more restrictive than
the ownership group, as it specifically excludes key employees and their
affiliated entities and trusts.
a. Analysis
Given the critical distinction between the ownership group and the
control group, a family office must analyze each group carefully to ensure
it is in compliance with the Rule. The placement of two such distinct re-
quirements next to one another in the same sentence is arguably confus-
ing. This placement is likely the result of the rule that the SEC originally
proposed, which required family offices to be both wholly owned and
controlled solely by "family members. z22 2 The SEC explained that public
comment letters persuaded it to broaden the ownership group to "family
clients" for two reasons. First, family offices are sometimes owned by
family trusts, which technically do not satisfy the definition of "family
member. '22 3 Second, family offices sometimes allow their employees to
own an equity interest in the office as an incentive for good perform-
218. Advisers Act Rule §202(a)(11)(G)-I, 17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(b)(2)
(2011).
219. Id.
220. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,984-85.
221. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(5).
222. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,762 (Oct. 12, 2010) ("Is wholly
owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) by family members.").
223. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,990.
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ance.2 24 In light of these practices, the SEC agreed to expand the owner-
ship group to "family clients. '22 5 But the SEC specifically declined to
expand the control group to "family clients," instead restricting it to
"family members and/or family entities." The SEC did not elaborate on
its decision, saying only that it believed "exclusive control" by family
members and family entities was necessary "for our core policy rationale
to be fulfilled-that a family office is essentially a family managing its
own wealth[.]" 226 In short, the SEC apparently believed a family office
would lose its fundamental character if it were under the control of non-
family members or entities, despite the fact the office might actually be
owned in part by such non-family persons.
The requirement that the family office be "wholly owned" by family
clients is straightforward. While the Adopting Release does not discuss
the various possible ownership configurations, assumedly if the family of-
fice is a corporation then all of its shares must be owned by family clients.
Similarly, if it is an LLC or partnership, then all of its membership or
partnership interests must be owned by family clients. The SEC staff has
explained that in its view, any non-voting shares in the family office must
also be owned by family clients.227
While the ownership requirement is quite clear, the control require-
ment defies simple explanation. The Rule states that the family office
must be "exclusively controlled (directly or indirectly) by one or more
family members and/or family entities." The Rule defines "control" as
"the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or
policies of a company, unless such power is solely the result of being an
officer of such company. '228 The SEC explained that it added the word
"exclusively" before "control" in the final rule "to clarify that 'control'
cannot be shared with individuals or companies that are not family mem-
bers or family entities. '22 9 However, the SEC did not elaborate on the
purpose of the phrase "(directly or indirectly)" after "exclusively
controlled."
The Rule plainly states that family members cannot establish "control"
over the family office merely by holding officer positions. Therefore, one
logical possibility might be that family members must establish control
over the family office by controlling its governing body-its board of di-
rectors, if a corporation, or its board of managers, if a manager-managed
LLC. Another logical possibility might be that majority ownership in the
family office, with the associated right to control the family office's "man-
agement or policies," would also be sufficient to establish control. Con-
trol via ownership would particularly seem to satisfy the Rule given the
fact it states control may be established "(directly or indirectly)."
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 37,991.
227. SEC Staff Q&A, supra note 151, at Question 1.3.
228. Advisers Act Rule § 202(a)(11)(G), 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-A(d)(2) (2011).
229. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,990 n.104 (emphasis added).
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Although the SEC itself has not officially addressed how "control" can
be established, the staff of the SEC's Division of Investment Manage-
ment has addressed the question in a document available on the SEC
website titled "Staff Responses to Questions About the Family Office
Rule" (the "Staff Q&A").230 While the Staff Q&A represents the views
of the SEC staff only, and is "not a rule, regulation, or statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission," '2 31 family offices would seem to
ignore this document at their peril since the Division of Investment Man-
agement is responsible for enforcement of the Advisers Act.
The relevant passages of the Staff Q&A are directed at family offices
organized as corporations. Surprisingly, given the Rule's inclusion of the
phrase "(directly or indirectly)," the SEC staff does not consider mere
majority ownership of a family office by family members and family enti-
ties to be a sufficient means of fulfilling the control requirement.2 32 This
is apparently the staff's view regardless of whether family members' and
family entities' ownership gives them the ability to appoint the family
office's board of directors. According to the SEC staff, "The right to ap-
point, terminate, or replace board members, by itself, does not satisfy the
'exclusively controlled' standard. 2 33 The determinative factor, from the
SEC staff's standpoint, is actual board participation.2 34 And in the SEC
staff's view, only majority board participation by family members is suffi-
cient to meet the control standard.2 35 (Bear in mind family entities cannot
participate on a board of directors, as only natural persons can do this
under the laws of most states.2 3 6) In the example given by the SEC staff,
if a family office's board of directors has seven members, four of whom
are family members and three of whom are non-family members, the ex-
clusive control requirement is fulfilled "assuming there are no special
shareholders agreements or other arrangements that would give someone
that is neither a family member nor a family entity control over the man-
agement or policies of the family office." 237
The fact that majority, as opposed to unanimous, family member board
participation is sufficient is arguably in tension with the Rule's use of the
phrase "exclusively controlled," which the Adopting Release explained is
supposed to clarify that control "cannot be shared" with persons other
than family members or family entities. By allowing majority board par-
ticipation to suffice, the SEC staff is certainly taking a more realistic and
230. SEC Staff Q&A, supra note 151, at Questions 1.1 and 1.2.
231. SEC Staff Q&A, supra note 151.
232. Id. at Question 1.2.
233. Id.
234. Id. at Question 1.1.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., DEL. Comou ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (West 2015) ("The board of directors of a
corporation shall consist of 1 or more members, each of whom shall be a natural person.");
N.Y. Bus. Coiu,. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2015) ("[T]he business of a corporation shall be
managed under the direction of its board of directors, each of whom shall be at least eigh-
teen years of age."); FLA. STATr. ANN. § 607.0802 (West 2015) ("Directors must be natural
persons who are 18 years of age or older[.]").
237. SEC Staff Q&A, supra note 151, at Question 1.1.
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pragmatic approach than it otherwise might have. An outright ban on
outside directors would massively disrupt the governance structure of
many family offices and arguably be detrimental to those offices' owners
and family clients. 238
The Staff Q&A did not address LLC's or partnerships, so we can only
speculate how family offices organized as one of these types of entities
would satisfy the control requirement. In the case of a manager-managed
LLC, it seems almost certain that the SEC would view such a family of-
fice in the same way as a corporation and require majority family mem-
ber participation on the board of managers. In the case of member-
managed LLC's, however, the answer is less clear. Could key employees
and their affiliated entities or trusts be allowed to vote on any policies of
the firm? Or would complete, 100% voting control by family members
and family entities be required in the LLC's operating agreement? The
answer to this question is unclear.
With regard to family offices organized as limited partnerships, the de-
terminative factor would assumedly be the exercise of control over the
general partner. If the general partner is a corporation or manager-man-
aged LLC, then majority board participation by family members would
seem to suffice. But if the general partner is a member-managed LLC,
the family office would face the same dilemma of how much influence
non-family members such as key employees would be able to exercise.
b. Critique
The control requirement of subsection (b)(2) is problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. As discussed, the meaning of "exclusively controlled (di-
rectly or indirectly)" is unclear from the text of the Rule itself.
Furthermore, the SEC staff's interpretation seems to gloss over the text,
giving full effect neither to the phrase "exclusively controlled" nor to the
"(directly or indirectly)" parenthetical that follows it.
Given the SEC staff's statement that "[t]he right to appoint, terminate,
or replace board members, by itself, does not satisfy the 'exclusively con-
trolled' standard," it seems as though the SEC may have read "(directly
or indirectly)" out of the Rule altogether. Perhaps "(directly or indi-
rectly)" was simply carried over from the originally-proposed rule, ending
up in the final Rule without receiving close scrutiny. In the originally-
proposed rule, "(directly or indirectly)" modified both the ownership and
the control requirements, as follows: "Is wholly owned and controlled (di-
rectly or indirectly) by family members[.]" 239 The Adopting Release ex-
plains that "(directly or indirectly)" was originally included to allow
family members to own the family office indirectly, through family enti-
238. One study found that family office boards are composed of an average of five
members-four family members and one non-family member. See RosPi OCK, supra note
8, at 260.
239. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,762 (Oct. 12, 2010).
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ties. 240 In the final Rule, however, "(directly or indirectly)" appears to
modify only the "exclusively controlled" requirement. This view is sup-
ported by the fact "(directly or indirectly)" is no longer necessary to mod-
ify the ownership requirement, since "family clients" already includes the
many various family entities that allow for indirect ownership. In light of
the SEC staff's interpretation that essentially reads the words "(directly
or indirectly)" out of the final Rule, their purpose is unclear.
The SEC staff's narrow interpretation of what suffices as "control," in
addition to being in tension with the Rule's text, denies family offices the
ability to select the governance structure that best meets their needs.
While the Staff Q&A does allow family offices to include outside, non-
family directors on their board, these directors may only serve in a minor-
ity role, as family members must still constitute the majority. Given the
value of having "outside directors," who are neither owners nor employ-
ees of the company, the SEC's restrictive interpretation seems mis-
placed. 24 1 While one study found only 20% of family office directors are
outsiders,2 42 some family offices may actually prefer a majority non-fam-
ily board. There could be several reasons for such a preference. For ex-
ample, there may be an insufficient number of family members of adult
age or who have the necessary business sophistication to make board ser-
vice worthwhile. Or, the family office may have reached a stage similar to
that discussed in Section I, where over time family members have become
less involved with the family office's investment activities and desire
outside expertise and guidance. 2 43 Alternatively, the family may strive to
operate its family office with the discipline and objectivity characteristic
of a non-family wealth management firm, and it could find outside direc-
tors helpful in this regard. Given the statistics surrounding the failure of
family businesses after they have been passed down from the founding
generation, 244 the decision to utilize non-family members in a majority of
board positions could be prudent under certain circumstances.
As owners of the family office, the family would likely still have the
power to appoint and replace outside directors, so the family would
hardly be ceding complete control. Allowing majority board participation
by non-family members would therefore not undermine the policy goals
240. Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,990 (June 9, 2011) ("Some [com-
menters] stated that many family offices are owned by family trusts, and that allowing
family members to indirectly own and control the family office did not provide sufficient
clarity that such a trust could own and control the family office." (emphasis added)). Noth-
ing in the Adopting Release suggests the phrase still modifies the "wholly owned" require-
ment. Regardless of whether it does or not, because the ownership group ("family clients")
already consists of a broad array of entities owned and controlled by family clients, this
seems to be a purely academic question.
241. RosPLOCK, supra note 8, at 259 (noting "it is clearly a best practice in corporate
governance to have independent directors" as well as a study by one leading family busi-
ness researcher recommending a minimum of three independent directors for family
businesses).
242. Id. at 260.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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of the family office exclusion or of the Advisers Act. As the Senate Bank-
ing Committee explained, "family offices are not investment advisers in-
tended to be subject to registration under the Advisers Act. The Advisers
Act is not designed to regulate the interactions of family members, and
registration would unnecessarily intrude on the privacy of the family in-
volved." 245 The SEC itself reiterated these sentiments in both the Propos-
ing Release and the Adopting Release. 246 Few things would seem to be
more "private" or important to a family office than the choice of who is
to serve on its board of directors. Such a decision goes to the very heart
of a family office's identity, as well as its ability to thrive over the long
term.
It is unclear what the SEC staff's rationale was when it construed the
control requirement so narrowly. Perhaps it feared a reduced control re-
quirement could be used as a loophole by persons trying to take advan-
tage of the family office exclusion. Let us suppose, for the sake of
argument, that various investors join together to form an investment firm,
satisfy the Rule's definition of "key employee," and select an outside in-
vestor with significant financial means to serve as the nominal "family
member." We can suppose, also, that these "key employees" establish the
governance of the organization in such a way that prevents the "family
member" from exercising any meaningful control. This structure would
undeniably be contrary to the spirit and purpose behind the Family Office
Rule. The captive "family member," meanwhile, would be at the mercy of
the "key employees." Perhaps this is the type of arrangement the SEC
staff sought to prevent. Such a scenario could only come to pass, how-
ever, if the SEC were to abrogate the family control requirement of sub-
section (b)(2) completely. So long as family members and family entities
must still exercise at least indirect "control" over the family office, as the
Rule already states, the arrangement described in this paragraph would
be prohibited.
To remedy the current situation, the SEC does not need to amend the
text of the Rule at all. Rather, all that the SEC must do is simply give
effect to the phrase "(directly or indirectly)" by recognizing that the abil-
ity to appoint and remove a majority of a family office's board of direc-
tors is sufficient to establish "control." The SEC should issue a Release,
or the SEC staff should amend the Staff Q&A, clarifying that family
245. S. Riip. No. 111-176, at 75 (2010).
246. Release No. IA-3098, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,754 (Oct. 12, 2010) (Before the pas-
sage of Dodd-Frank, "[the SEC] viewed the typical single family office as not the sort of
arrangement that Congress designed the Advisers Act to regulate. We also were concerned
that application of the Advisers Act would intrude on the privacy of family members. Thus,
each of our orders exempted the particular family office from all of the provisions of the
Advisers Act (and not merely the registration provisions."); id. at 63,755 ("The core policy
judgment that formed the basis of our exemptive orders (and which prompted Congres-
sional action) is the lack of need for application of the Advisers Act to the typical single
family office."); Release No. IA-3220, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,984 (June 9, 2011) ("As we
discussed in the Proposing Release, our orders have provided an exclusion for family of-




members and family entities exercise "control" under the Rule so long as
they either control the family office directly, through majority board par-
ticipation, or indirectly, through the ability to appoint, terminate, or re-
place a majority of the board.
3. The Private Adviser Requirement
The Rule's third and final requirement in subsection (b)(3) prohibits
the family office from "hold[ing] itself out" to the public as an investment
adviser.247 The SEC has interpreted this standard broadly in the invest-
ment adviser context. 248 For example, the SEC has found an adviser to
hold itself out to the public where it used public advertising to obtain
clients, referred to itself as an investment adviser on business cards, or
sought word-of-mouth referrals from its existing clients.249
Subsection (b)(3) does not pose any difficulty to the family offices con-
templated by the Rule, which are private enterprises designed to offer
investment advice exclusively to a single family. The Rule is not directed
to multi-family offices or wealth management firms that simply happen to
be family-owned. 250 In addition, because the Rule already prohibits a
family office from advising anyone other than "family clients," it would
have no incentive to hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser
in the first place. As the Adopting Release states, "Holding itself out to
the public as an investment adviser suggests that the family office is seek-
ing to enter into typical advisory relationships with non-family clients,
and thus is inconsistent with the basis on which we have provided exemp-
tive orders and are adopting this rule."'251 The Rule's third and final re-
quirement is therefore easy for family offices to satisfy.
CONCLUSION
Certainly there is much about the family office exclusion and the Fam-
ily Office Rule that is commendable. Dodd-Frank's enactment of the ex-
clusion was a positive step, as Congress correctly recognized family
offices are not within the sphere of investment advisers intended to be
covered by the Advisers Act. Subjecting family offices to regulation
would be needless as well as harmful. No doubt there are many aspects of
247. Advisers Act Rule § 202(a)(l1)(G)-l, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-l(b)(3)
(2011).
248. 1 INVES'rMENT ADVISER REGULATION, supra note 52, § 2.2.1 [A]. Holding oneself
out to the public, it should be recalled, is one of the factors the SEC considers in determin-
ing whether one is "in the business" of providing investment advice and, therefore,
whether one is an investment adviser under the Act. See Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg.
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987); see also supra text accompanying note 72.
249. 1 INVESTMENT ADVISER RE.GULATION, supra note 52, § 2.2.1[A] (citing Brighton
Pac. Realty Asset Mgmt. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 75593 (Feb. 10, 1992);
Weiss, Barton Asset Mgmt., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26285 (Mar. 12, 1981); DJZ
Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12192 (Nov. 19, 1976); Frank T. Hines, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1972 WL 8250 (Aug. 21, 1972)).




the Advisers Act that are necessary to protect the public from predatory
or dubious investment advice. Family offices, however, are not among the
advisers in need of such regulation because they advise only family
clients.
Features of the Family Office Rule demonstrate a brilliant solution by
the SEC, one that balances family offices' need for flexibility with the
simultaneous need to protect the public from attempted abuse of the
Rule. For example, the ten-generation limit on "family members" inge-
niously provides a family office with great latitude to determine the scope
of family members it wishes to serve. At the same time, the ten-genera-
tion limit prevents misuse of the Rule by advisers trying to subvert the
Advisers Act. Another example of the Rule's success is its inclusion of
"key employees" as "family clients," a feature that respects the business
realities faced by family offices and the people who serve them. Here, the
Rule's definition of "key employee" was well-considered and skillfully
drafted not to turn exclusively on the employee's formal position, but
rather on their role at the family office and their degree of financial
sophistication.
Given the many well-conceived aspects of the Family Office Rule, it is
perplexing why a component so fundamental as subsection (b)(2)'s con-
trol requirement seems to have been drafted so haphazardly. While the
precise meaning of the phrase "exclusively controlled (directly or indi-
rectly)" is vague, the SEC staff's interpretation requiring majority family
member board participation is grounded neither in the Rule's text nor in
plain logic. "Control," defined as "the power to exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies" of a family office, should not
be interpreted so narrowly as to require direct majority board participa-
tion by family members in every instance. Rather, indirect control, exer-
cised through the ability to select the board's membership, should also be
sufficient to satisfy the Rule. The SEC should therefore either issue a
release or amend the Staff Q&A to state that family members and family
entities may satisfy the Rule's control requirement through the ability to





Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Section 409 - "FAMILY OFFICES"
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)) is amended by striking "or (G)" and
inserting the following: "; (G) any family office, as defined by rule, regu-
lation, or order of the Commission, in accordance with the purposes of
this title; or (H)".
(b) RULEMAKING.-The rules, regulations, or orders issued by the
Commission pursuant to section 202(a)(11)(G) of the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940, as added by this section, regarding the definition of the
term "family office" shall provide for an exemption
that-
(1) is consistent with the previous exemptive policy of the Commission,
as reflected in exemptive orders for family offices in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act, and the grandfathering provisions in paragraph
(3);
(2) recognizes the range of organizational, management, and employ-
ment structures and arrangements employed by family offices; and
(3) does not exclude any person who was not registered or required to be
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 on January 1, 2010
from the definition of the term "family office", solely because such per-
son provides investment advice to, and was engaged before January 1,
2010 in providing investment advice to-
(A) natural persons who, at the time of their applicable investment,
are officers, directors, or employees of the family office who-
(i) have invested with the family office before January 1, 2010;
and
(ii) are accredited investors, as defined in Regulation D of the
Commission (or any successor thereto) under the Securities Act
of 1933, or, as the Commission may prescribe by rule, the succes-
sors-in-interest thereto;
(B) any company owned exclusively and controlled by members of
the family of the family office, or as the Commission may prescribe
by rule;
(C) any investment adviser registered under the Investment Adviser
Act of 1940 that provides investment advice to the family office and
who identifies investment opportunities to the family office, and in-
vests in such transactions on substantially the same terms as the fam-
ily office invests, but does not invest in other funds advised by the
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family office, and whose assets as to which the family office directly
or indirectly provides investment advice represent, in the aggregate,
not more than 5 percent of the value of the total assets as to which
the family office provides investment advice.
(c) ANTIFRAUD AUTHORITY.-A family office that would not be a
family office, but for subsection (b)(3), shall be deemed to be an invest-
ment adviser for the purposes of paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of section
206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
SMU LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX 2
Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-I - "Family offices"
(a) Exclusion. A family office, as defined in this section, shall not be con-
sidered to be an investment adviser for purpose of the Act.
(b) Family office. A family office is a company (including its directors,
partners, members, managers, trustees, and employees acting within the
scope of their position or employment) that:
(1) Has no clients other than family clients; provided that if a person that
is not a family client becomes a client of the family office as a result of the
death of a family member or key employee or other involuntary transfer
from a family member or key employee, that person shall be deemed to
be a family client for purposes of this section for one year following the
completion of the transfer of legal title to the assets resulting from the
involuntary event;
(2) Is wholly owned by family clients and is exclusively controlled (di-
rectly or indirectly) by one or more family members and/or family enti-
ties; and
(3) Does not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser.
(c) Grandfathering. A family office as defined in paragraph (a) of this
section shall not exclude any person, who was not registered or required
to be registered under the Act on January 1, 2010, solely because such
person provides investment advice to, and was engaged before January 1,
2010 in providing investment advice to:
(1) Natural persons who, at the time of their applicable investment, are
officers, directors, or employees of the family office who have invested
with the family office before January 1, 2010 and are accredited investors,
as defined in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933;
(2) Any company owned exclusively and controlled by one or more fam-
ily members; or
(3) Any investment adviser registered under the Act that provides in-
vestment advice to the family office and who identifies investment oppor-
tunities to the family office, and invests in such transactions on
substantially the same terms as the family office invests, but does not in-
vest in other funds advised by the family office, and whose assets as to
which the family office directly or indirectly provides investment advice
represents, in the aggregate, not more than 5 percent of the value of the
total assets as to which the family office provides investment advice; pro-
vided that a family office that would not be a family office but for this
paragraph (c) shall be deemed to be an investment adviser for purposes
of paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of section 206 of the Act.
(d) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
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(1) Affiliated family office means a family office wholly owned by family
clients of another family office and that is controlled (directly or indi-
rectly) by one or more family members of such other family office and/or
family entities affiliated with such other family office and has no clients
other than family clients of such other family office.
(2) Control means the power to exercise a controlling influence over the
management or policies of a company, unless such power is solely the
result of being an officer of such company.
(3) Executive officer means the president, any vice president in charge of
a principal business unit, division or function (such as administration or
finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making function, or any
other person who performs similar policy-making functions, for the fam-
ily office.
(4) Family client means:
(i) Any family member;
(ii) Any former family member;
(iii) Any key employee;
(iv) Any former key employee, provided that upon the end of such
individual's employment by the family office, the former key em-
ployee shall not receive investment advice from the family office (or
invest additional assets with a family office-advised trust, foundation
or entity) other than with respect to assets advised (directly or indi-
rectly) by the family office immediately prior to the end of such indi-
vidual's employment, except that a former key employee shall be
permitted to receive investment advice from the family office with
respect to additional investments that the former key employee was
contractually obligated to make, and that relate to a family-office ad-
vised investment existing, in each case prior to the time the person
became a former key employee.
(v) Any non-profit organization, charitable foundation, charitable
trust (including charitable lead trusts and charitable remainder trusts
whose only current beneficiaries are other family clients and charita-
ble or non-profit organizations), or other charitable organization, in
each case for which all the funding such foundation, trust or organiza-
tion holds came exclusively from one or more other family clients;
(vi) Any estate of a family member, former family member, key em-
ployee, or, subject to the condition contained in paragraph (d)(4)(iv)
of this section, former key employee;
(vii) Any irrevocable trust in which one or more other family clients
are the only current beneficiaries;
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(viii) Any irrevocable trust funded exclusively by one or more other
family clients in which other family clients and non-profit organiza-
tions, charitable foundations, charitable trusts, or other charitable or-
ganizations are the only current beneficiaries;
(ix) Any revocable trust of which one or more other family clients
are the sole grantor;
(x) Any trust of which: Each trustee or other person authorized to
make decisions with respect to the trust is a key employee; and each
settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust is a key
employee or the key employee's current and/or former spouse or
spousal equivalent who, at the time of contribution, holds a joint,
community property, or other similar shared ownership interest with
the key employee; or
(xi) Any company wholly owned (directly or indirectly) exclusively
by, and operated for the sole benefit of, one or more other family
clients; provided that if any such entity is a pooled investment vehi-
cle, it is excepted from the definition of "investment company" under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.
(5) Family entity means any of the trusts, estates, companies or other
entities set forth in paragraphs (d)(4)(v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), or (xi) of
this section, but excluding key employees and their trusts from the defini-
tion of family client solely for purposes of this definition.
(6) Family member means all lineal descendants (including by adoption,
stepchildren, foster children, and individuals that were a minor when an-
other family member became a legal guardian of that individual) of a
common ancestor (who may be living or deceased), and such lineal de-
scendants' spouses or spousal equivalents; provided that the common an-
cestor is no more than 10 generations removed from the youngest
generation of family members.
(7) Former family member means a spouse, spousal equivalent, or
stepchild that was a family member but is no longer a family member due
to a divorce or other similar event.
(8) Key employee means any natural person (including any key em-
ployee's spouse or spouse equivalent who holds a joint, community prop-
erty, or other similar shared ownership interest with that key employee)
who is an executive officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person
serving in a similar capacity of the family office or its affiliated family
office or any employee of the family office or its affiliated family office
(other than an employee performing solely clerical, secretarial, or admin-
istrative functions with regard to the family office) who, in connection
with his or her regular functions or duties, participates in the investment
activities of the family office or affiliated family office, provided that such
employee has been performing such functions and duties for or on behalf
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of the family office or affiliated family office, or substantially similar func-
tions or duties for or on behalf of another company, for at least 12
months.
(9) Spousal equivalent means a cohabitant occupying a relationship gen-
erally equivalent to that of a spouse.
(e) Transition.
(1) Any company existing on July 21, 2011 that would qualify as a family
office under this section but for it having as a client one or more non-
profit organizations, charitable foundations, charitable trusts, or other
charitable organizations that have received funding from one or more in-
dividuals or companies that are not family clients shall be deemed to be a
family office under this section until December 31, 2013, provided that
such non-profit or charitable organization(s) do not accept any additional
funding from any non-family client after August 31, 2011 (other than
funding received prior to December 31, 2013 and provided in fulfillment
of any pledge made prior to August 31, 2011).
(2) Any company engaged in the business of providing investment ad-
vice, directly or indirectly, primarily to members of a single family on July
21, 2011, and that is not registered under the Act in reliance on section
203(b)(3) of this title on July 20, 2011, is exempt from registration as an
investment adviser under this title until March 30, 2012, provided that the
company:
(i) During the course of the preceding twelve months, has had fewer
than fifteen clients; and
(ii) Neither holds itself out generally to the public as an investment
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
80a), or a company which has elected to be a business development
company pursuant to section 54 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-54) and




Selections from Staff Responses to Questions About the
Family Office Rule
I. Ownership and Control of Family Office
Question 1.1
Q: A family office has a board of directors with seven directors, of which
four are family members and three are non-family members. Under the
governing documents of the family office, each director has an equal vot-
ing power and no minority veto power. Does this satisfy the standard set
forth in rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(b)(2) that a family office must be "exclu-
sively controlled" by family members and/or family entities?
A: Yes, assuming there are no special shareholders agreements or other
arrangements that would give someone that is neither a family member
nor a family entity control over the management or policies of the family
office. (Posted January 19, 2012)
Question 1.2
Q: All members of the board of directors of the family office are neither
family members nor family entities, but they are all appointed by family
members that have the right to appoint, terminate, or replace the direc-
tors. Does this arrangement satisfy the "exclusively controlled" standard?
A: No, unless the governing documents of the family office provide that
matters relating to the management or policies of the family office must
be decided by shareholders that are family members or family entities.
The right to appoint, terminate, or replace board members, by itself, does
not satisfy the "exclusively controlled" standard. (Posted January 19,
2012)
Question 1.3
Q: A family office plans to issue non-voting shares to a person that does
not qualify as a family client. Would this affect the determination of
whether the office is a family office under the new rule?
A: Yes, a family office must be wholly owned by family clients as defined
under the rule. A non-family client owning non-voting shares would
cause the office to lose its qualification as a family office under the rule.
(Posted January 19, 2012)
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